Review of the Office of Associate Administrator for Research and Acquisitions Core and Non-Core Mission Resource Usage

NAS Configuration Management and Evaluation Staff
Program Evaluation, ACM-10

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Some managers within the Office of the Associate Administrator for Research and Acquisitions (ARA) believed that too many resources were used for non-core mission activities. Core mission activities for ARA employees refers to work conducted on specific acquisition programs or National Airspace System operations directly related to the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) mission. Non-core mission activities are those that indirectly relate to FAA's mission and fall into the categories of core overhead or initiatives/other activities. Because of this belief, the integrated Process Group (iPG) tasked Program Evaluation, ACM-10, in September 1999, with inventorying current process improvement initiatives and, if possible, mapping their interrelationships. While acknowledging that not all ongoing initiatives were identified, ACM-10 issued a report listing 108 initiatives and activities. In addition, the report identified at least 55 different groups that may be associated with those initiatives. This information further increased the perception that too many resources were used for non-core mission activities and specifically initiatives/other activities. Some ARA managers also believed too many initiatives were underway at once, and some existing groups and initiatives might be inefficient. Thus, in February 2000 the ARA Management Team requested that ACM-10 conduct an evaluation to determine how ARA was using its resources (i.e., on core mission versus non-core mission work).

The evaluation objectives were to: (1) determine how ARA was using its resources among core mission and non-core mission activities, (2) identify and determine opportunities for consolidation and logical groupings of current initiatives, and (3) estimate the rough order of magnitude of resource usage for current initiatives.

The results of the review to determine how ARA employees expended their time in calendar year 1999 were based upon a questionnaire completed by the Office of Communications, Navigation, and Surveillance Systems (AND) employees. The results were analyzed and reflected more time expended on non-core mission activities than on core mission activities. The results also reflected more time spent on core overhead activities than on initiatives/other activities. Specifically, the evaluation team found 46.7 percent of the AND employees' time in calendar year 1999 was spent on core mission activities, and 53.3 percent was spent on non-core mission activities. Of this 53.3 percent, 40.1 percent was spent on core overhead, and 13.2 percent was spent on initiatives/other activities. Because the results were based upon employee recollection and not validated from a system or other objective and contemporaneous data, and due to the differences among ARA organizations, the AND results should not be extrapolated to all of ARA. During our review, we found the data in the ARA Cost Accounting System to be incomplete and not always accurate. In addition, no other system was identified within ARA as being used to track employee time spent on core mission or non-core mission activities. As a result, ARA managers had no meaningful data source to identify and to assist them in strategically managing resource allocation.

While ARA managers and employees had the perception that some existing initiatives and groups were inefficient due to overlaps, the evaluation team concluded that consolidation of current initiatives was not necessary. The team recognized that not all initiatives were identified,

and some that were considered initiatives during calendar year 1999 had converted into permanent activities and were therefore, not reviewed. Of those identified and reviewed, the evaluation team found no redundancies (i.e., actual duplication of work). The evaluation team did find, however, that confusion over initiatives existed among employees because of actual and apparent overlaps, but not redundancies, among the initiatives. This confusion was due to the ad hoc start up of initiatives that led to an impression of a duplication of work among initiatives and resulting in a negative impact on employee morale. The evaluation team identified some logical groupings based on relationships among initiatives/other activities. (See Exhibit C for examples.)

Although the evaluation team collected data of projected calendar year 2000 ARA resource usage on current initiatives, the team did not believe the data provided a meaningful rough order of magnitude resource estimate. The points of contact for the initiatives had difficulty: (1) separating initiative activities from core mission activities; (2) predicting unknown factors (e.g., number and length of meetings, amount of preparation time, extra assignments or tasks, ad hoc members, actual meeting attendance); and (3) reporting the amount of resources needed. While considerable effort was taken to collect the data, in the evaluation team's professional judgment, the rough order of magnitude resource estimate was not credible and would not be included in this evaluation report.

Summary of Recommendations

To assist management in properly identifying and strategically managing its human resources, the evaluation team recommends that the ARA Management Team:

1A   Determine acceptable resource allocation targets (e.g., percentages) for core mission and non-core mission (i.e., core overhead and initiatives/other) activities.

1B   Require ARA employees to track the expenditure of their time by appropriate core mission and non-core mission activities.

1C   Review and ensure the accuracy of ARA employee expenditures of time for core mission and non-core mission (i.e., core overhead and initiatives/other) activities.

1D   Take appropriate actions to mitigate the impact of non-core mission activities when pre-established targets (refer to Recommendation 1A above) are exceeded.

2A   Evaluate each new initiative/other activity prior to committing ARA resources.

2B   Develop a central informational repository that captures for each initiative/other activity the point of contact, purpose, goals/objectives, list of members, established schedule, resources, any other pertinent attributes that would be found in a charter, and a history of the initiative.

2C   Ensure all initiatives/other activities using ARA resources are included in the repository.

2D   Ensure ARA managers and employees consult the repository database for possible redundancy or coordination opportunities prior to starting a new initiative/other activity.

Included in the text of the report are specific suggestions for the ARA Management Team.

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INTRODUCTION

Background

Some managers within the Office of the Associate Administrator for Research and Acquisitions (ARA) believed that too many ARA resources were being used for non-core mission activities. Core mission activities are those that directly relate to the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) mission and include such things as working on specific acquisition programs or National Airspace System operations. Non-core mission activities are those that indirectly relate to FAA's mission. Non-core mission activities generally fall into two broad categories. The first category is core overhead. While indirectly related to the mission, these activities are generally required for FAA operations. Examples of core overhead are budget formulation and execution, contract administration, employee training, and secretarial and administrative duties. The second category of non-core mission activities is initiatives/other activities. These are also indirectly related to the FAA mission, but are usually not required. Instead, they are discretionary activities subject to prioritization. Examples of initiatives/other activities include process improvement activities, and actions on teams piloting new ideas or initiatives (e.g., the FAA Acquisition Executive Advisory Board, the Life Cycle Acquisition Management Process System). While these types of activities are not always viewed as necessary, they may also be important to FAA operations.

Because of the belief that too many resources were used for non-core mission activities, last year the integrated Process Group (iPG) tasked Program Evaluation, ACM-10, with inventorying current process improvement initiatives and, if possible, mapping their interrelationships. ACM-10 completed the inventory and on November 30, 1999, issued Report Number 1999-09, entitled *Inventory of Agency Process Improvement Initiatives*. While acknowledging that not all ongoing initiatives were identified, the report listed 108 initiatives and activities. In addition, the report identified at least 55 different groups that may be associated with those initiatives. This further increased the perception that too many resources were used for non-core mission activities.

Some ARA managers also believed too many initiatives/other activities were underway at once, and some existing groups and initiatives might be inefficient (e.g., overlapping work, groups performing activities other than those for which they were chartered). With a tightening budget, this issue had very important consequences because too many resources might be diverted from core mission activities. Thus, in February 2000 the ARA Management Team requested ACM-10 conduct an evaluation to determine how ARA was using its resources (i.e., on core mission versus non-core mission work).

Objectives

The evaluation objectives were to:

1. Determine how ARA was using its resources among core mission and non-core mission activities,
2. Identify and determine opportunities for consolidation and logical groupings of current initiatives/other activities, and
3. Estimate the rough order of magnitude of resource usage for current initiatives/other activities.

Scope

ACM-10 conducted this evaluation between January 18 and May 23, 2000. For Objective 1, the Office of Communications, Navigation, and Surveillance Systems (AND) organization volunteered to be the test group for ARA and answered a questionnaire so that information could be gathered on the time spent in core mission versus non-core mission activities. For Objective 2, we started with the list of 108 initiatives/other activities identified in our previous inventory and modified the list based upon information obtained throughout the January and May time period. For Objective 3, we contacted the leads and/or other points of contact identified for the initiatives to obtain estimates of resource usage projected for calendar year 2000. Results for Objective 1 were based solely on data received from AND employees. Results for Objectives 2 and 3 were based on input and data received from ARA, Air Traffic Services (ATS), and other Agency personnel as applicable to the various initiatives/other activities, work groups, overhead or core mission activities.

Limitations

There are several limitations on using the results of this review. First, while use of a questionnaire resulted in data on how time was spent by AND resources in calendar year 1999, the questionnaire relied on the employees' recollection of how their time was spent. Although this was the best information available, its usage should be limited. Second, while of interest to all in ARA, the results of the questionnaire denoting the amount of time spent on core mission and non-core mission activities should not be extrapolated to the rest of ARA. The functions are different, and extrapolation may result in inaccurate projections. Third, while a number of additional initiatives/other activities were identified during this evaluation, initiatives were constantly starting, merging, splitting or ending throughout this evaluation. As a result, the list of initiatives should not be considered all-inclusive. Fourth, the logical groupings of current initiatives/other activities we depict in Exhibit C reflect the relationships by affiliation to organizations, work groups, and activities existing in FAA at the time of the evaluation. It is not a comprehensive representation of the sponsors and coordinating relationships that may actually exist. Fifth, we looked at ARA government resource usage only. While we attempted to solicit contractor resource usage information from product team leads as part of our questionnaire, the data received was minimal.

Methodology

To determine how ARA was using its resources among core mission and non-core mission activities, identify and determine opportunities for consolidation and logical groupings of current initiatives/other activities, and estimate the rough order of magnitude of resource usage for current initiatives/other activities, the evaluation team performed the following:

- Analyzed the data in ARA's Cost Accounting System (CAS) and determined it had not been populated with sufficient information to be useful on this evaluation.
- Developed, sent to all AND employees, and analyzed the responses to a questionnaire requesting information on how AND resources were spent in calendar year 1999. The response rate to the questionnaire was 42.92 percent. (See Exhibit A for the questionnaire.)
- Provided examples of non-core mission activities to AND employees completing the questionnaire. Used the ARA CAS indirect project codes for core overhead examples and data collected from our previous evaluation for initiatives/other activities examples.
- Solicited employee input into what might be considered duplicative or of little value.
- Searched electronic databases, and FAA's Intranet and the Internet.
- Identified 168 potential initiatives, activities and work groups. (See Exhibit D for a complete listing.)
- Reviewed various charters, plans and other initiative documents.
- Interviewed multiple people within the Agency including team leads and other points of contact for the initiatives.

RESULTS OF EVALUATION

Using AND as a sample of ARA resources, the evaluation team found 46.7 percent of government employees' time in calendar year 1999 was spent on core mission activities, and 53.3 percent was spent on non-core mission activities. Within the non-core mission activities, more time was allocated to core overhead activities than initiatives/other activities. Specifically, of the 53.3 percent, 40.1 percent was spent on core overhead and 13.2 percent on initiatives/other activities.[1]

The evaluation team also found no redundancies (i.e., where two or more current initiatives/other activities were duplicating efforts). Therefore, the team concluded that consolidation of ongoing initiatives/other activities was not necessary. In fact, the evaluation team found good efforts in coordination and cooperation between initiatives/other activities. The evaluation team did find, however, confusion regarding the initiatives/other activities among employees because of actual and apparent overlaps, but no redundancies existed among initiatives. Actual overlaps consisted of different groups performing related activities, single initiatives split into multiple entities with different focuses, related initiatives operating under different schedules, and Regions, Centers and Headquarters groups performing related activities. Apparent overlaps resulted from how the groups performing initiatives were named and how they evolved.

When determining the logical groupings for current initiatives/other activities, the evaluation team found the most insightful grouping was by relationship among initiatives. Many of the initiatives could be grouped based on specific linkages among the efforts, sometimes centered around particular sponsors (e.g., individuals, organizations) or drivers (e.g., laws, policies, procedures, politics). During the analysis, the team found there was a proliferation of sponsors and drivers for the initiatives/other activities identified. The proliferation of sponsors and drivers throughout the agency was due to the ad hoc start up of initiatives/other activities. This ad hoc process led to an impression of a duplication of work among initiatives/other activities, this resulted in added confusion and had a negative impact on employee morale.

Although the evaluation team collected data on projected calendar year 2000 ARA resource usage on current initiatives/other activities, the team did not believe that the data provided a meaningful rough order of magnitude estimate of resource usage. The points of contact for the initiatives had difficulty separating initiative activities from core mission activities, predicting unknown factors, and reporting the amount of resources needed to accomplish the activities. While considerable effort was taken to collect data on projected calendar year 2000 ARA resource usage on initiatives/other activities, in the evaluation team's professional judgment, the rough order of magnitude resource estimate was not credible and would not be included in this evaluation report.

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[1] Caution should be applied when using these results as the data was not verifiable with objective and contemporaneous data, and an AND sample cannot be assumed to be representative of all ARA.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

**Finding #1: More Time Was Allocated to Core Overhead Than
Initiatives/Other Activities**

The evaluation team found 46.7 percent of the AND organization's employees' time in calendar
year 1999 was spent on core mission activities, and 53.3 percent was spent on non-core mission
activities. Within the non-core mission activities, more time was allocated to core overhead than
initiatives/other activities. While these results came directly from AND employees, the data was
not verifiable with objective and contemporaneous records. Reliable data did not exist on where
ARA employees spent their time, and there was confusion over what constituted core overhead
and initiatives/other activities. As a result, the ARA Management Team did not really know how
employees were spending their time, and this could affect their ability to strategically manage
human resources.

Core mission activities for ARA employees refers to work conducted on specific acquisition
programs or National Airspace System (NAS) operations directly related to FAA's mission.
Non-core mission activities are those that indirectly relate to FAA's mission and fall into two
broad categories. The first category is core overhead. While indirectly related to the mission,
these activities are generally required for FAA operations. Examples of core overhead are budget
formulation and execution, contract administration, employee training, and secretarial and
administrative duties. The second category of non-core mission activities is initiatives/other
activities. These are also indirectly related to the FAA mission, but are usually not required.
Instead, they are discretionary activities subject to prioritization. Examples of initiatives/other
activities include process improvement activities, and actions of teams piloting new ideas or
initiatives [e.g., the FAA Acquisition Executive Advisory Board (FAB), the Life Cycle
Acquisition Management Process (LAMP)]. While these types of activities are not always
viewed as necessary, they may also be important to FAA operations.

The evaluation team developed and distributed a questionnaire to all 240 AND employees and
asked that they allocate their working hours for calendar year 1999 into the core mission and two
non-core mission categories (i.e., core overhead, and initiatives/other activities). (See Exhibit A
for a copy of the questionnaire.) To assist the respondents, the evaluation team provided
examples of core mission and the non-core mission activities of core overhead and
initiatives/other activities. The examples provided of the core overhead activities were extracts
from the ARA CAS indirect codes, as defined by ARA. The examples of initiatives/other
activities were extracted from the *Inventory of Agency Process Improvement Initiatives* report
issued November 30, 1999. We believe the responses were generally based upon employees'
recollection of time spent on the activities in calendar year 1999 and not necessarily daily records
or other contemporaneously prepared documents. As a result, the accuracy of the data could not
be objectively verified.

The results of the questionnaire shown in Table 1 below demonstrated that for all responses, 46.7 percent of AND employees' time in calendar year 1999 was spent on core mission activities, and 53.3 percent (40.1 percent plus 13.2 percent) was spent on non-core mission activities. The results also indicated that core overhead activities took more of the AND employees' time than initiatives/other activities.

Table 1. Questionnaire Results from AND Employees – Calendar Year 1999

Respondent Categories	Core Mission	Non-Core Mission: Core Overhead	Non-Core Mission: Initiatives/ Other Activities	Number in Category
All Responses	46.7%	40.1%	13.2%	103
Core Mission Employees	57.2%	29.8%	13.0%	80
Non-Core Mission Employees	10.2%	75.8%	14.0%	23

We further separated the results by core mission and non-core mission employees. Eighty of the 103 questionnaire respondents (78 percent) were core mission employees, and according to the questionnaire responses, spent almost 30 percent of their time on core overhead activities while spending only 13 percent of their time on initiatives/other activities. Twenty-three of the 103 questionnaire respondents (22 percent) were non-core mission employees and spent almost 76 percent of their time on core overhead activities and 14 percent on initiatives/other activities.

Whether core or non-core mission employees, the amount of time spent on initiatives/other activities was almost identical. The two groups differed by only one percentage point. For non-core mission employees, the amount of time spent on core overhead activities was high (almost seventy-six percent) but expected for employees not working directly on programs.

The evaluation team made no judgment on whether percentages of time spent by AND employees on core mission and non-core mission activities were appropriate. The data in Table 1 merely reflects the time employees stated they expended.

To provide further insight, Exhibit B reflects the items AND employees stated were core overhead and initiatives/other activities that they were working on in calendar year 1999. The more commonly reported core overhead items were budget activities, leave (e.g., annual, sick, holiday, administrative), performance management and core compensation activities, and training. The more commonly listed initiatives/other activities were those based on the subject matters of integrated Capability Maturity Model (iCMM) and Information Security (InfoSec).

Explanation of the Data

A. Reliable data did not exist on where ARA employees spent their time:

In answering how ARA was using its resources, the evaluation team expected the ARA CAS to be the most likely source for detailed data tracking of where the employees spent their time. The ARA CAS codes were not used by all in ARA and the data entered was not always accurate. Apparently, general guidance had been distributed, but no set business rules on how to use the codes. Individual ARA organizations were left to police themselves and a number of them did not mandate or monitor the use of the ARA CAS. A recent concerted effort to increase the usage of the ARA CAS has been promoted to the ARA organization's deputies. During our review, we found no other system was used to track employee time spent on core mission or non-core mission activities. As a result, ARA managers had no meaningful data source to identify and to assist them in strategically managing resource allocation.

Given the ARA CAS was not a reliable data point, and no other system was identified as tracking the type of data we needed, the evaluation team worked with members of the ARA Management Team in developing an acceptable approach to determine where ARA employees allocated their time during calendar year 1999. A scientific survey was not conducted. The ARA Management Team approved the evaluation team's proposal to use a questionnaire and several managers from AND offered their organization as the test group. As a result, the data here only represents time expended by the AND organization and not all of ARA.

B. Confusion existed in completing the questionnaire:

While the results of the questionnaire are noted and discussed above, confusion existed over what constituted core overhead and initiatives/other activities. Confusion existed because there were disagreements and reservations about the ARA CAS definitions on some of the project codes. The respondents had difficulty deciding whether to classify non-core mission activities as core overhead or initiatives/other activities, and several employees even stated some non-core mission activities (identified in the ARA CAS as indirect project codes/overhead activities) should be considered core mission work (e.g., configuration management and investment analysis). The evaluation team did not reclassify employee allocations between the categories of core mission, core overhead or initiatives/other activities. In addition, this evaluation was not to review the data accuracy and/or usefulness and appropriateness of the established ARA CAS coding. Thus, for the purposes of this evaluation, we used the ARA CAS indirect project codes as core overhead activities.

Confusion also existed because some activities that were initiatives during calendar year 1999 had become established core mission or core overhead activities by calendar year 2000. Some examples of these activities were the iCMM Maturity Level 2 process improvement activities, InfoSec activities, Core Compensation Program, Performance Management Plans, Model Work Environment, Human Resource/Personnel Reform, and Intellectual Capital Investment Plan.

Employees struggled to categorize and respond appropriately to the questionnaire, and we understand the frustration. Clear definitions did not exist for what was considered core overhead and what was considered initiatives/other activities. In addition, it was not clear when an initiative ceased to be an initiative and actually became part of an established core mission or core overhead process. Management will likewise struggle with identifying and managing resource allocation if these issues persist.

Recommendations

To assist management in properly identifying and strategically managing resources, reliable data is needed on how employees are spending their time. Because reliable data did not exist on where employees spent their time, the evaluation team recommends that the ARA Management Team:

1A   Determine acceptable resource allocation targets (e.g., percentages) for core mission and non-core mission (i.e., core overhead and initiatives/other) activities.

1B   Require ARA employees to track the expenditure of their time by appropriate core mission and non-core mission activities.

- To accomplish this, the team suggests that the ARA Management Team agrees on, and clearly defines, core mission and non-core mission (i.e., core overhead and initiatives/other) activities. In addition, we suggest establishing a uniform methodology for capturing these activities in a centralized database for ease in tracking and reporting.

1C   Review and ensure the accuracy of ARA employee expenditures of time for core mission and non-core mission (i.e., core overhead and initiatives/other) activities.

- To accomplish this, the team suggests that the ARA Management Team randomly check the time reports and, at the very least, target those areas outside of core mission activities that use the largest percentage of resources and ensure these are tracked (e.g., budgeting, reporting and process improvement initiatives).

1D   Take appropriate actions to mitigate the impact of non-core mission activities when pre-established targets (refer to Recommendation 1A above) are exceeded.

Finding #2: Consolidation of Ongoing Initiatives/Other Activities Was Not Necessary

The evaluation team did not find redundancies where two or more current initiatives were duplicating efforts and, therefore, concluded that consolidation of ongoing initiatives was not necessary. However, the continual proliferation of initiatives led to confusion among management and agency employees, including the evaluation team. Therefore, the evaluation team performed logical groupings of initiatives as linkages between them were identified, mainly based upon relationships. See Exhibit C for examples of the groupings mapped by the team.

Initiatives/other activities are originated throughout the agency on an ad-hoc basis, usually with numerous sponsors (e.g., individuals, organizations) or drivers (e.g., laws, policies, procedures, politics). For example, three lines of business sponsor the iPG. Conversely, the process improvements promoted by the iPG were identified as the driver of at least five different working groups or committees. No central control mechanism existed for agency coordination over the numerous initiatives/other activities. As a result, the proliferation of initiatives throughout the agency gave the impression that initiatives/other activities must be duplicative or redundant. The evaluation team did find confusion regarding the initiatives among employees because of actual and apparent overlaps, but found that no redundancies existed among initiatives.

Rationale for the Confusion

A. <u>Actual Overlaps</u>

Actual overlaps occurred when there was confusion over different groups performing related activities, when single initiatives split into multiple entities with different focuses, when related initiatives operated under different schedules, and when Regions, Centers, and Headquarters groups performed related activities. Because the initiatives focused on different facets of the same or related subject, or requested the same data in different formats or for different time periods, there was an impression that the initiatives were duplicative and thus, inefficient. However, the evaluation team did not find any redundancies (i.e., actual duplication of work) in these overlaps that would require the consolidation of initiatives.

1. Different Groups Performing Related Activities

In some cases we found different groups performing related activities that resulted in actual overlaps, but the overlaps did not make the groups redundant. The FAA Acquisition Executive Advisory Board (FAB), the System Engineering Operational Analysis Team (SEOAT), and the Acquisition System Advisory Group (ASAG) are examples of different groups performing related activities.

- The FAB, which was established as a pilot effort in August 1999, considers requests for waivers to the Acquisition Management System process submitted by the programs and makes recommendations to the FAA Acquisition Executive (FAE) for tailoring the process to program needs.
- The SEOAT makes funding recommendations and affordability assessments of programs in conjunction with Investment Analysis Teams to the Joint Resources Council (JRC).
- The ASAG develops, approves, and updates any substantial acquisition management and procurement policy and guidance changes necessary to the Acquisition Management System.

Although these groups perform related activities, they have different roles and responsibilities. They need to share information and coordinate activities. In fact, the evaluation team found good efforts in coordination and cooperation between initiatives. Linking members were often established to keep all parties informed and provide points of view from different perspectives, which would prevent overlap. Linking members between initiatives assist in sharing information, coordinating activities, and ensuring the groups' boundaries remain intact.

2. Single Initiatives Split into Multiple Entities with Different Focuses

Sometimes one initiative would split into two or more related initiatives that resulted in actual overlaps, but each initiative had a different focus. The Service-Oriented Portfolio Management initiative was an example of a single initiative split into multiple entities with a different focus. Figure 1 reflects this alignment. This initiative started in December 1999 and was subsequently organized into three entities: the Steering Committee, the Alignment Team, and the Pilot Team. The focuses of these groups were

oversight, alignment and input from the lines of business, and a test of the portfolio management tools and techniques on oceanic services, respectively. All three entities were part of the same initiative, but focused on different aspects of portfolio management. Hence, there was no duplication.

Figure 1. Split Initiative

3. Related Initiatives Operating Under Different Schedules

At other times, an actual overlap occurred when there were two or more related initiatives that worked under different time frames. See Figure 2. The Customer Service Process Advisory Group and two other organizations conducting customer service reviews from the Offices of Air Traffic Systems Development (ARU) and Operational Support Service (AOS) were examples of related initiatives operating under different schedules. All three groups focused on customer service and were interviewing employees at FAA's Technical Center. However, because they were operating under different schedules, they could not consolidate and conduct interviews at the same time.

Figure 2. Related Initiatives with Different Schedules

4. Regions, Centers and Headquarters Groups Performing Related Activities

Finally, the evaluation team found that actual overlaps occurred when there were similar activities occurring in multiple locations (i.e., Headquarters, Regions, and/or Centers). While these groups overlapped in that each performed process improvement activities, these activities did not duplicate work. See Figure 3.

Each group targeted either the Regions, Centers, or Headquarters organizations; and there was coordination and sharing of information between them. The Technical Center Engineering Process Group (TEPG) was an example of a Center's process improvement group, and the iPG was an example of a Headquarters' process improvement group. Both groups focused on process improvements, yet did not duplicate efforts.

Figure 3. Groups Performing Related Process Improvement Activities

B. Apparent Overlaps

Apparent overlaps occurred when there was confusion over how groups performing initiatives were named and how they evolved. This confusion over initiatives might have led to the impression that there were many initiatives doing duplicative and inefficient work.

However, the evaluation team did not find any redundancies in these apparent overlaps that would require the consolidation of initiatives.

1. *How Groups Were Named*

    Apparent overlaps resulting from how groups were named fell into two categories. First, some initiatives were known by their formal group names and by informal names. An example of a formal group name and an informal name being used for an initiative was the Process Assets Working Group (PAWG) initiative that was often referred to informally as the iPG Process Asset Library (iPAL). The iPAL was actually the name of the product of the PAWG. Although there was confusion that led some to believe there was more than one initiative with the same role, there was in fact only one initiative and no duplication.

    Second, several groups all with similar names existed, but all had different purposes. The iPG Communications Working Group (CWG) and the Communications Process Advisory Group (Communications PAG) are examples of groups with similar names but different purposes. The CWG was developed to coordinate communications for all the iPG process improvement initiatives. The Communications PAG was initiated by the Office of Independent Operational Test and Evaluation (ATQ) as a result of a problem identified in one of their Regional offices. Since these two groups did not interact with each other and had different purposes, there was no overlap.

2. *How Groups Evolved*

    Apparent overlaps resulting from how groups evolved also fell into two categories. In the first category, when one group found its purpose or goal was larger than originally understood, additional groups evolved to take on this expanded or changed purpose. One example of a group evolving into new groups is the Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System (STARS) Human Factors Process Group that evolved into the Human Factors Process Group. This group then evolved into the Human Factors Implementation, Planning, and Support Subteam. See Figure 4. Although there was confusion over the three differently named human factor groups that might have led some to believe that all three groups existed at the same time, they actually existed at consecutive times. As these human factor groups evolved, they changed their names to reflect the expansion of their purpose. They did not, however, overlap.


Figure 4. Organizational Evolution

In the second category, sometimes two or more groups merged into one group. See Figure 5. The Office of Air Traffic Systems Development (AUA) and AND software engineering process groups were an example of separate groups merging into a single group, [i.e., the integrated Software Engineering Process Group (iSEPG)]. This combined iSEPG group had the additional onus of being confused with the former Corporate Software Engineering Process Group (SEPG), which subsequently changed its name to the iPG.

Figure 5. Group Evolution

Actual and apparent overlaps led to confusion among employees over which initiative or group had responsibility for a process and over how many initiatives existed. This confusion resulted in a negative effect on employee morale and might have led to ARA management's impression that initiatives were duplicating work.

Logical Groupings

The evaluation team further analyzed current initiatives and determined the most insightful logical grouping was based on relationships among initiatives/other activities. (See Exhibit C for these groupings.) The team found there was a proliferation of sponsors and drivers for the initiatives identified. This was caused by the fact that initiatives started up on an ad hoc basis throughout the agency without any centralized control point, although the initiatives used resources from many lines of business. The proliferation of sponsors and drivers further led to the impression that there was a duplication of work among initiatives and further confusion over initiatives. This was exacerbated by the fact that there was no central information point that captured all initiatives. On the positive side, the proliferation of sponsors reflects there were a number of people interested in improving FAA operations.

The evaluation team also identified an effort within the Office of the Assistant Administrator for Information Services and Chief Information Officer (AIO) to establish a database for process improvement initiatives. The AIO, however, does not have organizational authority over the other lines of business and cannot unilaterally mandate use of this centralized control mechanism. Therefore, without support from other organizations, this will probably not correct the situation.

Recommendations

Ideally, a centralized control mechanism that brings the lines of business together to develop corporate positions on new initiatives/other activities should be established. This centralized control mechanism would be placed organizationally above the lines of business. Because the ARA Management Team cannot establish and mandate an agency wide centralized control over all Agency initiatives/other activities, the evaluation team recommends that the ARA Management Team:

2A   Evaluate each new initiative/other activity prior to committing ARA resources.

- To accomplish this, the team suggests that the ARA Management Team review the estimated resources, purpose, goals, and schedule prior to approving the use of ARA resources.

2B   Develop a central informational repository that captures for each initiative/other activity the point of contact, purpose, goals/objectives, list of members, established schedule, resources, any other pertinent attributes that would be found in a charter, and a history of the initiative.

- To accomplish this, the team suggests that the ARA Management Team request this informational repository be established and maintained by the AIO as the Chief Information Officer of the agency, as this is congruent with their mission. In addition, the repository should also be accessible to all FAA employees via the Intranet, to the various lines of businesses' home pages, and linked to the FAA Acquisition System Toolset (FAST).

2C   Ensure all initiatives/other activities using ARA resources are included in the repository.

2D   Ensure ARA managers and employees consult the repository database for possible redundancy or coordination opportunities prior to starting a new initiative/other activity.

Finding #3: A Meaningful Rough Order of Magnitude of Resource Usage on Current Initiatives Was Not Possible.

Although the evaluation team collected data on projected calendar year 2000 ARA resource usage on current initiatives, the team did not believe the data provided a meaningful rough order of magnitude estimate of resources. This occurred because employees had difficulty separating initiative activities from core mission activities; predicting unknown factors (e.g., number and length of meetings, amount of preparation time, extra assignments or tasks, ad hoc members, actual meeting attendance); and reporting on the amount of resources needed.

A. *Separating Initiative Activities from Core Mission Activities*

Employees had difficulty distinguishing between their regular job duties and responsibilities, and those of ongoing initiatives. One example of this involved those working on system engineering issues as part of the Systems Engineering Council (SEC). While work on the SEC is technically a current initiative, some of these employees believed this was part of their usual duties and responsibilities in core mission work on a program.

It is crucial to understand that the mission of certain ARA organizations is to perform essential core overhead work (e.g., budget, configuration management, investment analysis, and personnel activities). Oftentimes, people have difficulty separating these essential functions from core mission activities. In addition, the fact that people frequently could not distinguish initiatives focusing on improvements from their main activities was not necessarily negative. Employees stated that initiatives developed to resolve an existing problem or assist them in streamlining or improving an existing process associated with their core mission activity (e.g., acquisition program) would be beneficial to the agency and the flying public. Perceived value added and expected benefits could result from these various initiatives.

B. *Predicting Unknown Factors*

Employees also had difficulty predicting unknown factors such as the number of meetings to be held, the length of meetings, the amount of preparation time, any extra assignments or tasks, ad hoc members, and the unpredictability of meeting attendance. For example, the FAB distribution list reflected 88 recipients as of March 30, 2000. Because our evaluation focused on ARA resource usage, we identified at least 29 ARA members on the distribution list. At the January 7, 2000, meeting, 7 of the 16 people that attended were representatives from ARA. Noting the participants, we do not expect the same ARA representatives would attend every FAB meeting. Attendance varied depending upon whether the topic of discussion was applicable to the particular program areas. Thus, we saw ad hoc and unpredictable meeting attendance. The charter was in draft form when we reviewed meeting attendance, and meetings were predicted to be every other week for approximately two hours. An exact method for calculating time expended in formal meetings, on preparation work for meetings, or post-meeting action was not definitive.

C. Reporting on the Amount of Resources Needed

There was also a potential for the initiative team leads and members to underestimate the amount of resources required for an initiative, since they were aware of ARA managers' perception that initiatives used too many resources for non-core mission activities. The people contacted by the evaluation team were aware of the agency perception that too much non-core mission activity was underway.

While considerable effort was taken to collect data on projected calendar year 2000 ARA resource usage on initiatives, the evaluation team determined that, in their professional judgment, the rough order of magnitude resource estimate was not credible and would not be included in this evaluation report.

Recommendations

No recommendations were necessary for this particular finding.

EXHIBITS

Exhibit A—Questionnaire Distributed to AND Employees

Initiatives Right Sizing Questionnaire

Your organization code: AND - _____

For questions 1 through 7, answer based on time **you personally expended** only.

1.   How many months were you an AND employee during calendar year 1999? _____ months

2.   Estimate to the best of your ability the percentage of time you spent on the following three types of activities below during calendar year 1999, with the three activities together equaling 100%.

A.   Core Mission Activities

(i.e., planning and implementing specific programs and projects. This includes program management and actual work on programs, including expanded product team activities, program control, contract management, requirements management, and risk management.)   _____%

Please list all Core Mission Activities performed during calendar year 1999:
e.g., WAAS; LAAS; ASR-11; other F&E; O&M; or R,E&D funded programs

B. Non-Core Mission Activities – Core Overhead (as defined by ARA's Cost Accounting System)

(e.g., budget formulation/execution, supervision, core compensation, training, secretarial duties, administrative duties, annual/sick/holiday leave, investment analysis, configuration management) For additional examples of overhead activities, refer to page 3.   _____%

List only the SIGNIFICANT Overhead Activities which were time consuming this past year	Percentage	Total # Hrs* (if possible)
e.g., Budget	20%	400

C.   Non-Core Mission Activities – Initiatives/Other Activities

(e.g., iCMM Initiatives, ICIP, INFOSEC, LAMPS, Portfolio Management)   _____%
For additional examples of potential initiatives, refer to page 3.

Please be as specific/detailed as possible in listing initiatives that you were involved with during calendar year 1999.	Total # Hrs*
e.g., iCMM	

Note: Please expand the table or continue on a separate sheet if necessary.

* Total # of Hours should be estimated to the best of your ability based upon time spent in meetings, pre-meeting planning time, coordination time, post-meeting action items, and follow-up time spent for the activity.

TOTAL percentages for A, B, and C above should equal   **100%**

Initiatives Right Sizing Questionnaire

3. List the initiatives that you believe may be duplicative, overlap, redundant or conflicting with other initiatives or established processes and provide specific examples:

4. What existing activities, initiatives, or working groups do you believe may provide very little value to the Agency or do not contribute to the accomplishment of the Agency's mission? Why?

Optional Section:

5. Check all that apply, but at least one in each column below
    Your Position: Your Pay Category:
    _____   Supervisor/Manager/IPT Lead   _____ Administrative
    _____   PT Lead   _____ Professional
    _____Project Manager   _____ Technical
    _____   PT Member   _____ Engineer
    _____   Other _____

6. Name:_____

7. Comments:

For Product Team Leads Only:

8. Optional – estimate contractor hours expended in calendar year 1999 for the initiatives that were tasked to them. Estimate to the best of your ability the total number of all hours expended by all contractors on the initiative.

List initiatives for which contractor hours were expended:	Number of Contractor Employees	Total $ Expended	Total Hrs Expended
e.g., iCMM	3	$20,000	500
1.			
2.			
3.			
4.			

   Note: continue on a separate sheet if necessary.

Please return questionnaire to Zena Huen, ACM-10, 358-5273 by March 15, 2000. Thank you.

Initiatives Right Sizing Questionnaire

Examples of Non-Core Mission Activities
Initiatives/Other Activities and Core Overhead (incomplete list)
Do Not Limit Yourself to This Listing
If you worked on activities not listed below tell us in response to Question 2C.

I. Examples of Potential Initiatives/Other Activities

Life Cycle Management
- FAA Acquisition Executive Advisory Board (FAB) Activities
- Life Cycle Acquisition Management Process System (LAMPS)
- In-Service Review Checklist
- Configuration Management (CM) Policy, Process and Procedures Changes
- System Prototypes in Active Air Traffic Control Facilities: Development and Evaluation Process
- NAS Technical Architecture
- NAS Service Management System (NSMS)
- Integrated Logistics Working Group – Initiative to Update NAILS Order 1800.58
- Proposed System Engineering Council (SEC)
- System Technology Evolution Planning (STEP)

Human Resources
- Acquisition Workforce Learning System (AWLS)
- PDTS Business Systems Integrated Planning

Financial
- Services Based - Portfolio Management
- Research & Development (R&D) Portfolio/Research Financial Management
- Business Systems Integrated Planning (BSIP)
- Cost Accounting System (CAS)
- Operations Budget Process Review

IPG
- Process Action Teams (PATs)
- Process Assets Working Group (PAWG)
- Integrated Learning Resources Working Group (iLRG)
- Metrics Working Group – Metrics Process Improvement

ISO-9000 Activities
IPLT Activities
FAA-iCMM Activities

Miscellaneous
- Customer Service Process

II. Examples of Core Overhead

All items below were extracted from ARA's Cost Accounting System (CAS) listing of indirect project codes.

- F&E, RE&D, and OPS Budget Formulation and Execution
- Congressional FOIA's
- NAS Baseline Management
- Configuration Management
- Program Evaluation/Metrics
- Contract Administration
- Travel Processing
- Training
- Staffing
- Secretarial Duties
- Administrative Duties
- Annual/Sick/Holiday Leave
- Labor/Employee Relations
- Conference/Workshops
- Management, monitoring & maintenance of inventory levels
- Performance Management
- Data Management
- Business Management
- JRC/MAR
- Guidelines and Standards

Exhibit B—AND Respondents Listing of Overhead and Initiatives/Other Activities

The inventory provided below reflects the actual items AND Questionnaire respondents listed as core overhead and initiatives/other activities they had worked during calendar year 1999.

Core Overhead Items Listed:

Administrative Duties
AND MWE Council
Baseline Management
Budget*
Business Management
Conferences
Configuration Management
Congressional FOIAs
Contract Administration
Corporate Management
Data Management
Financial Support
Guidelines and Standards
IBEAM/SPIRE
Info. Resource Mgmt. Sys.
Inventory Management
Investment Analysis
IPLT Meetings
JRC/MAR
Labor/Employee Relations
Leave*
Perform Mgmt/Core Comp*
Planning
Program Eval/Metrics
Program Reporting
Proj. Mgmt. Reviews
Staffing
Supervision
Team Building/Team Mtgs.
Training*
Travel Processing

5 Year Plan
Affirmative Action
All Working Groups
AND Program Process Revisions
AWLS Development Teams
Balanced Score Card
Budget Drills
Clean Audit Activities
Configuration Management Steering Group (CMSG)
Configuration Management (CM)
Congressional Responses
Core Compensation System
Cost Accounting System (CAS)
Cost of Ownership
Culture Action
Customer Service Process
Earned Value Management (EVM)
Enterprise Chart – Decision Making Tool
Executive Level Metrics
FAA G 2100 revision
FAB Activities
Federal Manager's Financial Integrity Act (FMFIA)
Fee for Service
General Process Improvements
ICIP Counsel
ICMM*
ILS
InfoSec*
Integrated Learning Resources Working Group
IPDS Team Sessions
IPG Process Action Team (Measurement)
IPLT
In-Service Review (ISR) Checklist
IST
Life Cycle Acquisition Management Process System (LAMPS)
Metrics Activities/Metrics Working Group
Model Work Environment (MWE)
NAS Architecture
Operations Budget Process Review
OST Environment Streamlining
Program/Performance Management Planning
Portfolio Management
Product Team Plan Review
Program Status Reports
R&D Portfolio/Research Financial Management
R,E&D Transfers & Budget Formulation
Risk Assessment/Analysis/Management Initiatives
Role Council
Safety Initiatives
SLEP
Specifications Review
System Engineering Processes/Council
Total Cost Ownership (TCO)
Year2K

∗ Most Commonly Listed AND Responses in bold and underlined.

Initiatives/Other Activities Listed:

Exhibit C—Examples of Groupings by Relationships

The evaluation team analyzed current initiatives and determined the most insightful logical grouping was based on relationships among initiatives. These groupings are shown below. The groupings are intended to depict the linkages among groups reviewed by the evaluation team. The charts do not include all relationships among initiatives. Further, the charts are not meant to represent specific hierarchy or organizational standing of individual groups.

Figure C-1. Groups Provided for in the Acquisition Management System

Figure C-2. IPLT Sponsored Groups Related To Process Improvements

Figure C-3. FAB Activities Related To Process Improvements

Figure C-4. iPG/AIO Sponsored Groups and Activities Related To Process Improvements

Process Action Teams
1. **Aeronautical Data Link/Enroute Controller Pilot Data Link**
2. **Terminal Radar Program (ASR-11)**
3. **Display System Replacement**
4. **Host and Oceanic Computer System Replacement**
5. **Integrated Terminal Weather System**
6. **Operational and Supportability Implementation System**
7. **Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System**
8. **Wide Area Augmentation System**
9. **Weather and Radar Processor**

Figure C-5. AUA/AND/ACT/iPG Sponsored Groups and Activities Related to iCMM Process Improvements

**Industry and Government
Safer Skies Effort**

**General Aviation
Joint Steering Committee
(JSC)**

FAA
-AVR   -ASY
-ARA   -ATS

**Commercial Aviation
Safety Team
(CAST)**

FAA
-AVR   -ASY
-ARA   -ATS

<u>**Joint Safety Analysis Teams**</u>
1. Weather
2. Runway Incursion
3. Controlled Flight into Terrain
4. Aeronautical Decision Making
5. Loss of Control
6. Survivability

<u>**Joint Safety Implementation Teams**</u>
1. Weather
2. Runway Incursion
3. Controlled Flight into Terrain
4. Aeronautical Decision Making
5. Loss of Control
6. Survivability

<u>**Joint Safety Analysis Teams**</u>
1. Weather
2. Runway Incursion
3. Controlled Flight into Terrain
4. Turbulence
5. Loss of Control
6. Approach and Landing
7. Uncontained Engine Failure

<u>**Joint Safety Implementation Teams**</u>
1. Weather
2. Runway Incursion
3. Controlled Flight into Terrain
4. Turbulence
5. Loss of Control
6. Approach and Landing
7. Uncontained Engine Failure

**Figure C-6. Aviation Safety Groups and Activities Related
to Safer Skies Process Improvements**

ATS

**Independent
Operational
Test and
Evaluation**

**Communications
Process
Advisory
Group**

**Test and
Evaluation
Process
Advisory
Group**

**Roles and
Responsibilities
Process
Advisory
Group**

**Customer
Service
Process
Advisory
Group**

**Figure C-7. IOT&E Sponsored Process Advisory Groups
Related To Process Improvements**

Exhibit D—Listing of Potential Initiatives, Activities or Work Groups Pursued in This Evaluation

The items listed below were identified in either this evaluation or the previous evaluation reported in the *Inventory of Agency Process Improvement Initiatives*. The evaluation team reviewed the initiatives that included process improvement initiatives, work groups and other activities. While a considerable number of initiatives were identified, initiatives started, merged, split or ended throughout this evaluation. Consequently, this should not be considered a comprehensive list of initiatives currently ongoing in the Agency.

The evaluation team did not establish definitions of what is an initiative, an activity, or a working group. During the course of the evaluation all three terms were used interchangeably.

NUMBER   **TITLE OF POTENTIAL INITIATIVES, ACTIVITIES, WORK GROUPS**

Life Cycle Management

1	FAA Acquisition Executive Advisory Board (FAB) – Proposals to tailor AMS policies
2	Research Evaluation Plan (REP)/Strategic Analysis-Program Statement (Sub Team of FAB)
3	Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) and Tech Refresh (Sub Team of FAB)
4	Facility Consolidation (Sub Team of FAB)
5	AMS Baseline Changes (Sub Team of FAB)
6	Configuration Management (CM) Policy, Process and Procedures Changes
7	System Prototypes in Active Air Traffic Control Facilities: Development and Evaluation Process
8	NAS Technical Architecture
9	NAS Infrastructure Management (NIM)
10	NAS Service Management System (NSMS)
11	Risk Management Initiative
12	Integrated Logistics Working Group – Initiative to Update National Integrated Logistics Support (NAILS) Order 1800.58
13	System Engineering Council (SEC)
14	AND System Engineering Workgroup
15	System Technology Evolution Planning (STEP)
16	Mission Analysis/Investment Analysis AMS Policy Change
17	Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS)
18	Acquisition Management System (AMS)
19	Integrated Product Development System (IPDS)
20	Integrated Baseline Establishment and Management (I-BEAM)
21	NAS Architecture
22	Project Management Environment Improvement Activities (PMEIA)

NUMBER	TITLE OF POTENTIAL INITIATIVES, ACTIVITIES, WORK GROUPS
23	Research Policy
24	Mission Analysis Steering Group
25	Acquisition System Advisory Group
26	Performance Based Management of Periodic Maintenance
27	Post Implementation Evaluation
28	Business Plan
29	Total Cost Ownership

ISO-9000

30	ISO-9000 (ASU)
31	ISO-9000 (AML) Logistics Center
32	ISO-9000 (AMQ) Office of Acquisition
33	ISO-9000 (AVN-300) Flight Inspection Maintenance Division.
34	ISO-9000 Based Quality Management System (ANI)

Human Resources

35	Core Compensation Program
36	ICIP Role Specific Curricula for Workforce Development
37	Performance Management Plans (PMP)
38	HR/Personnel Reform
39	Personnel Management System
40	Modernization of Human Resource Information System Program
41	Model Work Environment (MWE)
42	Intellectual Capital Investment Plan (ICIP)
43	Personnel Data Tracking System (PDTS)

IPLT

44	In-Service Review Checklist
45	IPLT Sub Group on In-Service Decision Process/Action Plans
46	IPLT Sub Group IPLT/IMT Service Orientation
47	IPLT Sub Group Human Factors, (currently on-hold as of 2-10-00) Implementation Planning & Support
48	IPLT Sub Group Headquarters IPDS Infrastructure
49	IPLT Sub Group Forming, Dissolving, Changing IPDS Teams
50	IPLT Sub Group JRC Delegation
51	IPLT Sub Group CNS IMT
52	IPLT Sub Group Roles and Responsibilities Metrics
53	IPLT Sub Group Life Cycle Acquisition Management Process (LAMP)
54	IPLT Sub Group Lifecycle Management System (LMS)

FAA-iCMM

55	FAA Integrated Capability Maturity Model (FAA-iCMM)
56	Process Action Team (PAT) – Needs - FAA iCMM PA 01
57	Process Action Team (PAT) – Requirements - FAA iCMM PA 02
58	Process Action Team (PAT) – Outsourcing - FAA iCMM PA 05
59	Process Action Team (PAT) – System Test and Evaluation - FAA iCMM PA 08
60	Process Action Team (PAT) – Transition - FAA iCMM PA 09

NUMBER	TITLE OF POTENTIAL INITIATIVES, ACTIVITIES, WORK GROUPS
61	Process Action Team (PAT) – Project Management - FAA iCMM PA 11
62	Process Action Team (PAT) – Contract Management - FAA iCMM PA 12
63	Process Action Team (PAT) – Quality Assurance and Management - FAA iCMM PA 15
64	Process Action Team (PAT) – Configuration Management - FAA iCMM PA 16

ARA PATs (Project level)

65	Aeronautical Data Link (ADL) EnRoute Controller Pilot Data Link (CPDLC) PAT
66	Terminal Radar Program (ASR-11) PAT
67	Display System Replacement (DSR) PAT
68	Integrated Terminal Weather System (ITWS) PAT
69	Operational and Supportability Implementation System (OASIS) PAT
70	Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) PAT
71	Weather and Radar Processor (WARP) PAT
72	Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System (STARS) P3I PAT
73	Host and Oceanic Computer System Replacement (HOCSR) PAT
74	Oceanic PAT
75	Traffic Flow Management (TFM) Enhanced Traffic Management System (ETMS)
76	Technical Center Engineering Process Group (TEPG)
77	ARS iCMM Program
78	FAA iCMM Appraisal 2000

Financial

79	Portfolio Management – Steering Committee
80	Portfolio Management – Pilot Team
81	Portfolio Management – Alignment Team
82	Balance Score Card
83	Research & Development (R&D) Portfolio/Research Financial Management
84	Business Systems Integrated Planning (BSIP)
85	Cost Accounting System (CAS) Initiatives
86	Operations Budget Process Review
87	Performance Based Organization (PBO)

IPG

88	iPG Working Group Communications Working Group
89	Process Action Team (PAT) Working Group (PWG)
90	iCMM Evolution Working Group
91	Integrated Software Engineering Process Group (iSEPG)
92	AMS/IPDS/iCMM Alignment (A-Triple-I) Working Group
93	12207 Working Group
94	Process Assets Working Group (PAWG) Product = integrated Process Group Process Asset Library (iPAL)
95	Integrated Learning Resources Working Group (iLRG)
96	Metrics Working Group – Metrics Process Improvement

Systems

97	Dynamic Object Oriented Requirements System (DOORS)

98	Regional Information System (REGIS)
99	NAS Infrastructure Management System (NIMS)
100	AND-700 Part 171 Process
101	Departmental Accounting Financial Information System (DAFIS)
102	Delphi
103	AOP Integrated Planning Model (IPM) [a.k.a. Modified Budget Requirements Tool (MBRT) and Integrated Planning and Budgeting Information System

Government Performance Results Act (GPRA)

104	Government Performance Results Act (GPRA) – New Performance System
105	Strategic Planning, Problem Solving Board
106	Resource Management Council or Planning Board
107	FAA Strategic Plan
108	ARA Performance Plan
109	ATS Performance Plan
110	Capital Investment Plan (CIP)
111	Research, Engineering & Development (R,E&D) Plan

Process Advisory Group (PAG)

112	Test & Evaluation
113	Roles & Responsibilities
114	Communications
115	Customer Service Process

Aviation Safety Teams

116	Joint Steering Committee (JSC) (umbrella team for the Joint Safety Analysis and Joint Safety Implementation Teams under general aviation)
117	JSC - General Aviation Weather Joint Safety Analysis Team
118	JSC - General Aviation Weather Joint Safety Implementation Team
119	JSC - Runway Incursion Joint Safety Analysis Team
120	JSC - Runway Incursion Joint Safety Implementation Team
121	JSC - General Aviation Controlled Flight into Terrain Joint Safety Analysis Team
122	JSC - General Aviation Controlled Flight into Terrain Joint Safety Implementation Team
123	JSC - Aeronautical Decision Making Joint Safety Analysis Team
124	JSC - Aeronautical Decision Making Joint Safety Implementation Team
125	JSC - Loss of Control Joint Safety Analysis Team
126	JSC - Loss of Control Joint Safety Implementation Team
127	JSC - Survivability Joint Safety Analysis Team
128	JSC - Survivability Joint Safety Implementation Team
129	Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) (umbrella team for the Joint Safety Analysis and Joint Safety Implementation Teams under commercial aviation)
130	CAST - Approach & Landing Joint Safety Analysis Team
131	CAST - Uncontained Engine Failure Joint Safety Analysis Team
132	CAST - Uncontained Engine Failure Joint Safety Implementation Team
133	CAST - Controlled Flight into Terrain Joint Safety Analysis Team

NUMBER   TITLE OF POTENTIAL INITIATIVES, ACTIVITIES, WORK GROUPS

134	CAST - Controlled Flight into Terrain and Approach & Landing Joint Safety Implementation Team
135	CAST - Weather Joint Safety Analysis Team
136	CAST - Turbulence Joint Safety Analysis Team (subteam to Weather JSAT)
137	CAST - Weather & Turbulence Joint Safety Implementation Team
138	CAST - Runway Incursion Joint Safety Analysis Team
139	CAST - Runway Incursion Joint Safety Implementation Team
140	CAST - Loss of Control Joint Safety Analysis Team
142	CAST - Loss of Control Joint Safety Implementation Team

Miscellaneous

143	INFO SEC – Information Systems Security Budget Process
144	INFO SEC - Order 1370.82
145	INFO SEC - System Certification and Authorization
146	Business Systems
147	Business Case
148	AOS Activities
149	System Acquisition and Engineering (contract and business)
150	Integrate Enterprise Tools
151	Enterprise Management Tools
152	ATS Workforce Learning System
153	Implementation of RTCA Certification Task Force 4 Recommendations
154	JRC Portfolio Review & Approval
155	AOS Quality Executive Oversight Council (QEOC)
156	AOS Quality Assurance Committee (AQAC)
157	Software Grand Design
158	Certification Process Improvement
159	Organization Designation Authorization (ODA)
160	Administrator's Listening Sessions with customers
161	Risk Assessment Analysis Process Initiative
162	Policy Statement for Involving Union
163	Fee for Service
164	Corporate Metrics
165	AUA Big Map
166	On the Job Training (OJT)
167	Combined Federal Campaign (CFC)
168	RTCA DO-178B

Exhibit E—Acronyms

ACT	William J. Hughes Technical Center
AIO	Office of Assistant Administrator for Information Services and Chief Information Officer
AMS	Acquisition Management System
AND	Office of Communication, Navigation, and Surveillance Systems
AOS	Office of Operational Support Service
ARA	Office of Associate Administrator for Research and Acquisitions
ARU	Office of Air Traffic System Development
ASAG	Acquisition System Advisory Group
ATA	Office of Air Traffic Airspace Management
ATQ	Office of Independent Operational Test and Evaluation
ATS	Office of Associate Administrator for Air Traffic Services
AUA	Office of Air Traffic Systems Development
CAS	Cost Accounting System
CNS	Communication, Navigation, and Surveillance Systems
CWG	Communications Working Group
FAB	FAA Acquisition Executive Advisory Board
FAE	FAA Acquisition Executive
FAST	FAA Acquisition System Toolset
iCMM	integrated Capability Maturity Model
IMT	Integrated Management Team
InfoSec	Information Security
iPAL	integrated Process Group (iPG) Process Asset Library
IPDS	Integrated Product Development System
iPG	integrated Process Group
IPLT	Integrated Product Leadership Team
IPT	Integrated Product Team
iSEPG	integrated Software Engineering Process Group

JRC   Joint Resources Council

LOB   Line of Business

PAG   Process Advisory Group

PAT   Process Action Team

PAWG   Process Assets Working Group

PT   Product Team

SEC   Systems Engineering Council

SEOAT   System Engineering Operational Analysis Team

SEPG   Software Engineering Process Group

STARS   Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System